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Abstract This paper presents an analysis of then that appeals to discourse structure.
I argue that then does not make any truth-conditional contribution but rather coor-
dinates an anaphoric relation between consecutive discourse-moves. The meaning
contribution of then is captured in terms of felicity conditions: then requires that
two propositions enter into a ‘causal explanatory claim’-relation in which one (the
antecedent) provides the ‘reasons’ for the other (the consequent). This proposal tar-
gets then within conditionals and across discourse and considers discourse structure
as a key factor in explaining its behavior.
Keywords: Pragmatics, semantics, conditionals, causal explanations, discourse markers,
then.
1 Desiderata
It is not news that lexical items do not necessarily contribute truth-conditional
meaning. Non-truth conditional meaning contributions of lexical items have been
said to include reference to the participants’ epistemic state (e.g., evidentials), the
status of entities in the discourse (e.g., indefinites) or to contribute to other meaning
dimensions (see for example Potts 2005 on the expressive dimension). In this paper
I provide support for the view that lexical items also operate at the level of discourse
structure (also a type of non-truth-conditional meaning) and that to account for their
meaning we need to consider the grammar of an articulated discourse system.
It has already been claimed that the primary function of some lexical items is
“information structural”. The case was made in Beaver & Clark 2008 for exclusives,
whose main function is argued to be to comment on the current question under
discussion (in the framework of Roberts 1996; Büring 2003). Biezma 2009, 2011
argued that discourse itself and the internal functioning of discourse is responsible
for enriched meanings such as the “cornering effect”, and Biezma & Rawlins 2012a,
2014 argue that there is a pronominal system at the discourse-level and that discourse
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pronouns are anaphoric with discourse moves. Similarly, for German, Rojas-Sponda
2014 claims that the lexical item überhaupt signals that the utterance addresses a
previous discourse question.
In this paper I present further support for the importance of discourse structure
in the construction of meaning by investigating non-temporal then.1 I argue that then
is a discourse marker establishing an anaphoric relation with the previous discourse
move. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in §2 I present the relevant
data regarding then both in conditionals and across discourse; §3 reviews previous
proposals; and in §4 I argue that then is a discourse marker that imposes felicity
conditions: then establishes an anaphoric relation between the information gained
from the previous discourse move and information gained from the subsequent
move. I argue that then requires that antecedent and consequent establish a ‘causal
explanatory claim’.
2 Data
2.1 Then in conditionals
To keep the discussion manageable, only the presence of then in canonical condi-
tionals will be targeted (constructions consisting of an if -clause, the antecedent, and
a main clause, the consequent). The literature often treats conditional antecedents
(syntactically) as free relatives that adjoin to the matrix clause (see Bhatt & Pancheva
2006 for the syntax of conditionals), i.e., as correlatives, and in this tradition then
is the correlative proform. The question arises as to why then is possible in some
conditionals but not in others. One of the conclusions of this paper is that the
(un)availability of then is not in itself an argument supporting different syntactic
analysis of conditionals. I argue that when then is not available it is due to the fact
that the meaning brought about by then is implausible.
Then can appear in hypothetical conditionals: conditional structures in which it
is understood that the antecedent merely provides sufficient conditions for the truth
of the consequent.
(1) If you finished your homework, then you can go play outside.
However, there are some conditionals in which then is not possible:2
1 I won’t discuss similar markers in other languages (e.g., Spanish entonces) for space reasons.
2 Examples (2a)-(2c) are from von Fintel (1994). Von Fintel (1994) also reports the following example
with the corresponding judgement:
(i) If Smith were the Devil Incarnate, (# then) the Sheriff wants him.
However, speakers of English do not find this conditional good (with or without then). A way to
amend the example would be as follows:
(ii) If Smith were the Devil Incarnate, (then) the Sheriff would want him.
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(2) a. Even if Smith is dead, (#then) the Sheriff wants him.
b. If Smith is dead or alive, (#then) the Sheriff wants him.
c. Whether Smith is dead or alive, (#then) the Sheriff wants him.
d. If you are hungry, (#then) there is pizza in the fridge.
Besides the observation that then is not available in some conditionals, it is also
observed in the literature (see Davis 1983) that the presence of then triggers a
difference in meaning:
(3) a. If you open the refrigerator, it will not explode.
b. If you open the refrigerator, then it will not explode.
Davis (1983) claims that the utterance of (3a) conveys that your opening of the
fridge won’t cause it to explode, whereas this is not conveyed by the utterance of
(3b), whose interpretation is one in which your opening of the fridge will prevent it
from exploding. As we will see, Davis’s claim is too strong and given appropriate
contextual information (3a) can have the same interpretation as (3b) (see §4.5). But
in any case, there is a clear contrast in (3).
The impossibility of then in some conditionals together with the meaning dif-
ference observed in (3) calls for an analysis of then in which it makes a meaning
contribution beyond establishing an anaphoric relation.
2.2 Then across discourse
Then does not appear only in conditional constructions. We can also find then across
discourse with a meaning similar to the meaning we find in conditionals:
(4) Child: I finished my homework.
Dad: Well, then you can go play outside. [then-clause]
As in the case of conditionals, for then-clauses to be felicitous we need an ‘an-
tecedent’ from which the utterance of the then-clause follows. I will keep referring
loosely to what precedes the then-clause as the antecedent and the clause embedded
under then as the consequent. Terminology will be made precise in §4.
Notice that the then-clause uttered in (4) is not a conditional structure in which
the antecedent has been elided (and can be recovered discursively from the previous
Notice however that in this case, then is good. Iatridou 1994 also points out that only if conditionals
do not accept then:
(iii) Only if it is sunny (# then) will I visit you.
Notice however that Only if it is sunny, will I then visit you is fine, hence indicating that the (iii) is
bad possibly for independent syntactic reasons.
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utterance). That is, the then-clause in (4) is not equivalent to the conditional in (1).
To the utterance of the conditional in (1) the child can respond Don’t you believe
me?, but this response is not possible after the utterance of the then-clause in (4). The
protest is possible after the utterance of the conditional in (1) because the utterance of
the conditional triggers the inference that it is not known that the antecedent is true.
By uttering the conditional instead of just a declarative sentence the speaker leaves
open the possibility that the addressee did not finish his/her homework (despite
his claim). The protest is not possible in (4) because the utterance of the (plain)
then-clause does not trigger the same inference.
Notice that the nature of the antecedent to then-clauses may differ, as may differ
the nature of the embedded clauses. Regarding assertions, questions and imperatives,
all combinations are possible but for one (I am leaving out the combination in which
the clause type is the same in the examples below for space reasons):3
(5) Assertion - Imperative
A: I’m cold.
B: Then put on a sweater!
(6) Imperative - Assertion
A: He must confess! Cut off his
fingers!
B: Then you really are a sadist.
(7) Question - Assertion
A: What does “lambda” mean?
B: Then you didn’t understand
the lecture.
(8) Assertion - Question
A: He was cranky this morning.
B: Then, you told him?
(9) Imperative - Question
A: He must confess! Cut off his
fingers!
B: Then, was the press right
when they described us as a
bunch of sadists?
(10) # Question - Imperative
A: What does lambda mean?
B: # Then study today’s lesson!,
you will find out, hopefully!
B:
√
Study today’s lesson!, you
will find out, hopefully!
The interpretations of the examples above are that you have to put on a sweater
because you are cold (and want to be warmer); that you are a sadist because only
sadists order such torture; that you didn’t understand the lecture because you are
asking that very question; whether I should deduce that you told him because he was
cranky; whether I should accept that the press was right because you are ordering
such a butchery. An analysis of then has to derive all those readings and explain why
(10) is infelicitous.
3 The case of exclamatives is discussed in footnote 10.
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Notice that the parallel to Davis’s examples in (3) with plain then clauses have
similar interpretations:
(11) A: I’m gonna open the refrigerator.
B: Sure!, it will not explode.
(12) A: I’m gonna open the refrigerator.
B: Sure!, then it will not explode.
The interpretation of (11) is one in which your opening of the refrigerator won’t
make it explode. Notice however that in this case we lack the reading in which
your opening of the refrigerator will prevent it from exploding (which given a
very rich context could be obtained in Davis’s then-less-conditional example (3a)).
The missing reading in (11) is the reading available in (12): your opening of the
refrigerator will prevent it from exploding, just like in the conditional example (3b).
In light of the discussion above, it seems that the meaning of then is the same in
conditionals and across discourse, and that differences in interpretation (such as the
differences between (1) and (4) and between the possible interpretations for Davis’s
example (3b) (and the parallel (12) just discussed) and (3a) need to be explained in
terms of then being in different grammatical environments.
3 Previous proposals
In this paper I claim that then carries a meaning and is not just a proform. This
approach is defended also in Iatridou 1994 and von Fintel 1994. Paying attention
only to (canonical) conditionals, Iatridou and von Fintel make proposals that intu-
itively could be said to have a “causal-like” flavor.4 Iatridou (1994) proposes that
the utterance of the conditional If p, then q is equivalent to the utterance of the
conditional if p, q with the presupposition5 that not all ¬p worlds are q worlds.
(This is not exactly the causation intuition since it leaves open the possibility of
there being ¬p worlds that are q worlds.6) In Iatridou’s account we can derive the
impossibility of then in all conditionals in which the antecedent exhaustifies logical
space since the inference forced by the presence of then is not compatible with the
conditional itself: when the antecedent exhaustifies logical space, the conditional
claim is that the consequent is true no-matter what and there are no worlds in which
the consequent is not true. This is similar to the case of biscuit conditionals (BCs).
Iatridou 1994 considers them conditional assertions and, since the consequent is true
4 For Lewis causation is a relation between events: e1 causes e2 iff had e1 not occurred, e2 would have
not occurred (Lewis 1986b).
5 Iatridou 1994 calls this inference “presupposition”, but she warns the reader that she is using the term
loosely.
6 Any strengthening of the inference would have to be made pragmatically.
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no matter what, it is also impossible for there to be worlds in which the consequent
is not true, hence clashing with the inference triggered by then.
Von Fintel 1994 builds on Iatridou’s work and proposes that the presence of then
triggers the conventional implicature that only the antecedent-worlds are consequent-
worlds with the requirement that there be alternatives to the antecedent. In this
proposal the presence of then conveys that if the antecedent were not true, the
consequent would not be true. Like Iatridou’s proposal, von Fintel’s proposal
explains the impossibility of then in conditionals in which the antecedent exhaustifies
logical space and in BCs, in which the consequent is true regardless of the antecedent.
These proposals are not concerned with then-clauses across discourse. However,
regardless of how they could be amended to cover those cases, they face challenges
within the conditional empirical domain alone. Consider the following conditionals:
(13) I’m certainly taking a job, but so far all the opportunities require me to start
working at 7:00 a.m. Yes, as incredible as it sounds, if I take the Taco Bell
job, then I also start at 7:00 a.m.
(14) If Jim had asked Jack for help, then there would (have to) have been no
quarrel yesterday.
According to Iatridou 1994, the presence of then triggers the presupposition that
there are alternatives to the antecedent in which the consequent is not true. However,
the speaker uttering (13) does not assume such a thing and yet can include then in the
utterance. The example in (14) is a backtracker conditional: a conditional in which
the consequent temporally precedes the antecedent (see Lewis 1979 for discussion).
The speaker uttering (14) is not trying to convey that only worlds in which Jim asked
Jack for help are worlds in which there was no quarrel yesterday. Contrary to the
prediction made by the proposal in von Fintel (1994), the interpretation of (14) is
that the relevant worlds in which Jack asked John for help are also worlds in which
there was no previous quarrel, but not that only in worlds in which Jim asks Jack for
help was there no quarrel yesterday.
Even though the previous proposals fail to make the right predictions in some
cases, there is something quite appealing about the flavor of causation somehow
implicit in those analyses. It seems to respond to the intuition behind the ‘because’
paraphrase in examples (5)-(9). In the following sections I argue that then indicates
that antecedent and consequent together convey a ‘causal explanatory claim’.
4 Then: An analysis based on causal explanations
4.1 Then is a discourse marker
Looking at the paraphrases of the examples discussed above, the meaning con-
tribution of then does not appear to be backgrounded, i.e., entailed by discourse
6
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participants’ shared knowledge at the time of utterance. Let us conclude therefore
that then is not a presupposition trigger. There is also a problem with placing then
in the conventional implicature dimension, since its contribution is not speaker-
oriented (Potts 2005) (i.e., then-clauses do not present commitments expressed by
the speaker). At the same time, the contribution of then is not truth-conditional. One
way to see this is to apply Zimmermann’s (2008) diagnosis. Part of the empirical
evidence concerns the behavior of then with sentence-types other than declara-
tives. If the meaning of then were truth-conditional, its presence would affect the
truth-conditional meaning of the sentences it appears in, but it doesn’t:
(15) Deciding what dress to wear for her first date.
A: I don’t like the red dresses.
B: Then, do you want to wear the blue dress or the black dress?
Assuming that the truth-conditional meaning of a question is the set of possible
answers (Hamblin 1958, 1973; Karttunen 1977), and that the possible answers for
an alternative question are the alternatives spelled out in the individual disjuncts
(Belnap & Steel 1976; Karttunen & Peters 1976; Higginbotham 1991; Bartels 1999;
Biezma & Rawlins 2012b), the addition of then does not modify the meaning of the
question embedded under it (the answers are the same). The same can be seen with
imperatives:
(16) A: I’m cold.
B: Then, put on a sweater!
Whatever the semantics of imperatives, whether modal or not (see Schwager 2006;
Portner 2004, 2007; Eckardt 2011; Condoravdi & Lauer 2012 for different views),
there is no difference in the interpretation of the imperative with or without then.
What is then then? Looking at the examples above, then links the embedded
clause to the previous discourse. In (15) then indicates that the question is mo-
tivated/follows from information gained in the previous discourse move; in (16),
then indicates that the order follows/is motivated by information gained upon A’s
previous discourse move. The function of then can be characterized as some kind
of discourse function. However, it is not a discourse particle, if we take discourse
particles to establish “a link between the proposition expressed by an utterance
and the knowledge and belief systems of the discourse participants” (Zimmermann
2011: 2013). Looking at (16) it is clear that then does not add anything regarding
the degree of certainty towards B’s suggestion to A to put on a sweater.
The function of then seems to agree with that of a discourse marker: it signals
“the relationship of the basic message to the foregoing discourse” (Fraser 1990).
This is what we see in the examples above. But notice that the propositions targeted
7
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by then are not necessarily the content proposition of the previous utterance and
the content proposition of the clause embedded under then. Let’s take (16) for
instance. B’s utterance can be paraphrased by ‘I’m suggesting that you put on a
sweater because you want to be warmer’ (and I clearly consider that putting on a
sweater is the best way for you to get warmer). That A wants to be warmer is an
inference triggered by A’s claim that s/he is cold. With B’s utterance we learn (in
addition to the conventional meaning of the imperative) that B suggests that A puts
on a sweater. The claim that A is cold and the inference that s/he wants to be warmer
are crucial to evaluate the then-claim in relation with the consequent (see §4.4).
Let us consider the example in (17):
(17) A: Are our kids’ soccer uniforms red or blue?
B: Oh!, then they finally joined the team. I see...
The example in (17) shows that what triggers B’s utterance is not the propositional
content that the kids’ soccer uniforms are red or that the kids’ soccer uniform is blue
(the conventional meaning of the question, Hamblin 1958, 1973; Karttunen 1977).
B’s utterance is triggered by the information that the kids have a soccer uniform,
which is presupposed in A’s utterance. This example also shows that it is not the
relation between the conventional meaning of the clauses that is marked by then as
being ‘causal-like’ in nature: it is not that the kids having a soccer uniform “causes”
them to join the team (more specifically, it is not the case that had the uniform not
been red (or blue) the kids would have not joined the team).7 B’s utterance in (17)
could be rather paraphrased as ‘I am justified in claiming that the kids joined the
soccer team because I just learned that they have soccer uniforms for this year’s
league (and according to my knowledge of how things work, they have uniforms
only when they join the team)’.
In sum, then is a discourse marker that signals that the utterance of the embedded
clause is in some sense motivated by the preceding discourse move. This will be
made more precise below.
4.2 Causal explanatory claims
As we have noticed in the backtracking-like examples, the presence of then does
not convey that the antecedent p is a “cause” for the consequent q. However, there
is something quite intuitive about linking the presence of then with a causal-like
7 Temporal relations here are similar to those found in backtracking examples. In (17) the temporal
anchoring of the proposition embedded under then, that the kids joined the team, precedes the
acquisition of the uniform. Notice that Lewis (1979) already warns us about trying to exemplify
causation in these circumstances since it is usually the case that events causally depend on earlier
events and not the other way around.
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relation (as evidenced by our paraphrases with because). The thesis I defend in this
paper is that the presence of then indicates that the antecedent is a causal explanation
of the consequent.
The difference between causation and causal explanation was defended by
Davidson 1967 on the grounds of a difference in logical form. However, Beebee
2004 provides additional arguments (independent of logical form) supporting the
view that causal explanation is not necessarily a report of causation. Beebee (2004)
adopts Lewis’s (1986b) concept of explanation according to which “to explain an
event is to provide some information about its causal history” (Lewis 1986b) and
she considers that the causal history of an event is a “relational structure”.8 There
are ways of providing information about the history of an event beyond providing its
causes: “explanatory information comes in many shapes and sizes”. For example,
“an explainer well might be unable to specify fully any particular event in the history,
but might be in a position to make existential statements. He might say, for instance,
that the history includes and event of such-and-such-kinds [. . .] in other words, he
might make an existential statement to he effect that the history includes a pattern of
events of a certain sort” (Lewis 1986a: 240).
The proposal I present below argues that the presence of then indicates that
there is a dependency between antecedent and consequent: its presence indicates
that the combination of antecedent and consequent establishes a causal explanatory
claim. We are going to build on the idea of a causal explanatory relation even though
strictly speaking we are dealing with propositions and not events. We are targeting
the intuition of what it means to provide justification for the truth of the proposition.
Given this proposal, then makes a conventional contribution distinct from that of
conditionals. In the case of conditionals, and adopting a Lewis/Stalnaker analysis,
(roughly) a conditional (without then) if p, q simply conveys that in the most similar
worlds to the actual world (best worlds) in which p is true, q is also true. If we think
about this in a dynamic perspective, the conditional claim only provides a description
of the worlds in the context set. The presence of then adds to this conditional claim
that it is because of p that q (for specific examples see §4.4).
In an account in which conditionals containing then are causal explanatory
claims, the antecedent provides ‘causal information’ about the consequent. This
explanation is grounded in laws. In such an account it is predicted that conditionals
in which the antecedent is orthogonal9 to the consequent, then is not possible: the
8 Beebee 2004 adopts a “network model” (see also Steward 1997), based on Lewis’s work, in which
the causal relation is taken to be a directed segment and the causal relate as nodes. This model takes
history to be a vast causal network that can be represented as an inverted tree. See Schaffer 2008 for
an overview.
9 The relevant notion of orthogonality is the one in Lewis 1988: “Two subject matters M1 and M2 are
orthogonal iff, roughly, any way for M1 to be is compatible with any way for M2 to be. If we think of
9
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antecedent will not have any causal link to the consequent.
(2) a. Even if Smith is dead, (#then) the Sheriff wants him.
b. If Smith is dead or alive, (#then) the Sheriff wants him.
c. Whether Smith is dead or alive, (#then) the Sheriff wants him.
When the antecedent exhaustifies logical space, it does not provide a “causal expla-
nation” for the consequent, rendering the presence of then infelicitous.
4.3 Implementation
The analysis of then will be implemented by appealing to discourse, which will
provide the flexibility to deal with then across discourse and in conditionals. The
information gained in discourse moves will be modelled using Gunlogson’s (2001)
commitment slates, which allow us to track the information available to individual
discourse participants.
Let us consider that a discourse move Mi is the utterance of a sentence structure
syntactically headed by a force operator ([A[S]]; [Q[S]] or [Imp[S]]). Following Gun-
logson 2001, 2008 let us define a commitment slate as the set of propositions taken
to be true by a discourse participant. Every discourse participant has his/her own
commitment slate and these are bound to being consistent (the commitment slates
do not contain conflicting propositions).
(18) Commitment Slate
cosB,Mn = {p : B commits to p after Mn}
Notice that commitments made by participants do not need to correspond to explicit
utterances. Following Gunlogson (2008), an agent also implicitly commits to en-
tailments, presuppositions, and (non-cancelled) implicatures. In general, “anything
that an agent publicly treats as true for the purposes of the discourse will qualify as a
commitment.” Associated to the commitment slate we find the commitment state,
the set of worlds in the intersection of the propositions in the participant’s cos. With
the aid of the notion of commitment slate, let us now define information gain:
(19) Information gain:
IB,Mi= {p : p ∈ cosB, Mi & p /∈ cosB, Mi−1}, where Mi−1 is the move immedi-
ately preceding Mi and cosB,Mi is B’s commitment slate after Mi.
subject matters as equivalence relations, orthogonality means that for any worlds w and v there is a
world u such that M1(u,w) and M2(u,v). If we think of subject matters as partitions, orthogonality
means that M1 and M2 cut across each other: each cell of M1 intersects each cell of M2. Subject
matters are connected iff they are not orthogonal.” (Lewis 1988: 167)
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After a discourse move has taken place, we usually learn lots of things beyond the
propositional content of the utterance (see Stalnaker 2002). For example, after A’s
utterance in (17) B knows that A wonders what color the kids’ uniform is (A uttered
a question on that matter), but also that the kids have a soccer uniform (use of the
possessive) and that the soccer uniforms can only be red or blue (by virtue of the
presupposition triggered by alternative questions). All this information was not
necessarily known by B before A’s utterance (indeed in the context of utterance in
the example, none of this seems to be known by B before A’s utterance), and in that
case, all that information is now part of the information gain after A’s utterance.
With these notions in place we can now make a proposal for the meaning of
then. Given our conclusion that then is a discourse marker, even though it does not
affect the truth-conditions of the utterance, it imposes felicity conditions between
antecedent and consequent. We will build on the intuition that then signals a ‘causal
explanatory claim’ between antecedent and consequent. As noted earlier, causal
explanatory claims depend on patterns of events of a certain sort. Let us assume
that relevant regularities are law-like relations. Following Lewis (1994), laws are
generalizations about collections of truths. Which collection of truths is selected
to draw the generalization from is the result of a competition (between different
collection of truths) with respect to strength (a truth is stronger if it tells us more
about the world), simplicity (or systematicity) and fit (as summarized in Weatherson
2010, the collection of laws that entails that what does happen has at earlier times a
higher chance of happening has better fit than a collection that entails that it has a
lower chance of happening). In order for there to be a law-like dependence between
two propositions, the truth of one has to at least increase the probability of the truth
of the other. Laws are contingent (Lewis 1986c) and underlie causal explanations
(Lewis 1994), which is where we want to arrive in our investigation of then.
With these ingredients in hand, we can now propose the denotation in (20). I
follow Collins 1989; Iatridou 1991; Iatridou & Kroch 1993; von Fintel 1994 in
assuming that then is placed in SpecCP.
(20) Let A be the speaker, g an assignment function, P an ordering source formed
by regularities/laws and MB a modal base (Kratzer-style conversational
backgrounds), w@ the utterance world, and MAXP(w@)(X) the P-best worlds
in a set of worlds X ,J[CP Then [ Mi+1]]Kg(w@) = JMi+1K(w@), defined only if
∀w ∈MAXP(w@)([∩MB(w@)]∩g(i)), g(i+1)(w) = 1
Where for any discourse move M j, g( j) ∈ IA,M j .
According to the definition above, then does not change the truth-conditions of the
embedded clause, but imposes felicity conditions on the utterance of such clause.
According to (20), then is anaphoric with the previous discourse move. It coordinates
11
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a (salient) piece of information (identified by the assignment function) gained from
the utterance of the preceding move —the antecedent (either the propositional content
of the preceding move or any inference triggered by it)— and a piece information
gained by the utterance of the then-clause (also identified by the assignment function)
—the consequent. Then requires the two to be in a law-like modal relation. The
assignment function needs to find a proposition in the set of information gain after the
previous discourse that can be in a conditional relation with information gained after
the utterance of the clause embedded under then, taking into account an ordering
source based on laws/regularities (which could be epistemic). Upon the utterance of
the then-clause, participants reconstruct (part of) what the speaker learned after the
previous move. The constraint on the antecedent is that it stands in a law-dependence
with the consequent, which is retrieved from the information gained after the then
clause is uttered. In sum, then drives us to identify two propositions that stand in an
appropriate law-like relation.
A welcome prediction from the definition in (20) is that for then to be felicitously
included in an utterance, there must be a previous discourse move from which the
appropriate content can be recovered. This cashes out the anaphoric nature of then.
4.4 Case studies
Then in conditionals: I adopt a Lewis/Stalnaker/Kratzer analysis for indicative
conditionals. Under this account if -clauses are restrictors of a modal operator in the
main clause. Following Kratzer (1981, 1986), when there is no overt operator, there
must be a covert necessity (epistemic) one. Under this account, a conditional If p, q
states roughly that given the speaker’s knowledge, in the relevant antecedent-worlds,
the consequent is true. Following Heim (1992), the dynamic implementation of this
proposal is as follows:
(21) Simw(p) =
def
{w′ ∈W : w′ ∈ p and w′ resembles w no less than any other
world in p}
(22) For any context set c, clause φ , and clause ψ
c+[[ifφ ]ψ] = {w ∈ c : Simw(c+φ)+ψ = Simw(c+φ)}
According to (22), upon uttering a conditional we update the main context set with
the proposition denoted by the antecedent clause. In the next step the claim is that in
the resulting (temporary) context the consequent is true. At the end of the conditional
update, all the worlds ‘lost’ in the temporary context (those in which the consequent
is not true) are also lost in the main context. According to this definition, the context
update in conditionals is a two-step process: the context is updated first with the
antecedent and then with the consequent.
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As stated in (22), conditionals simply describe what the worlds in the context
set are like. The semantics of conditionals in itself does not require that there
be a correlation between antecedent and consequent. A conditional can be true
even if there isn’t a law-like dependence between the antecedent and consequent
proposition. For example, in the case of the unconditional Whether it rains or not,
Jones wears his hat, in which the antecedent exhaustifies logical space, we only
learn that in all the worlds in the context set Jones wears his hat (see Rawlins 2013).
There is no law-like link between the weather and the wearing of the hat by Jones
(the antecedent is true in all possible worlds—its truth does not raise the probability
of the consequent being true). Then is similar to conditionals in the sense that it
coordinates a relation between two propositions, but it requires a more particular
relation between the “antecedent” and ‘consequent’. Given (20), there must be a
salient law-like link between the two. In cases in which this does not hold, as in
Whether it rains or not, Jones wears his hat, then is not possible.
Let us examine the following epistemic example:
(23) If there is light in John’s room, then he is home.
We can map each context update in conditionals to the two discourse moves:
(24) M1 There is light in John’s room.
M2 John is home.
Upon the utterance of the if -clause we learn/assume (temporarily) that there is light
in John’s room, and after the utterance of the consequent we learn that he is home.
(25) a. IB, M1 = {There is light in John’s room}
b. IB, M2 = {John is home}
The conditional (without then) has as truth-conditions that given what the speaker
knows, in the relevant antecedent worlds, the consequent is true. This could be an
accidentally true description of the worlds in the domain or it could be an inference
based on epistemic generalizations. The felicity conditions imposed by then ensure
a law-like link between antecedent and consequent. Given the regularities of John’s
behavior (he always turns off the lights when he is not home), the lights being on
allows us to conclude that he is home. If the conditional itself is interpreted in
relation to this kind of generalizations, the presence of then would be superfluous.
In the presence of then, we understand that it is because the antecedent is true
that we can claim the consequent is true.
Then across discourse: In the case of then across discourse, the felicity conditions
impose a modal relation between the antecedent and the consequent:
(26) A: I’m cold. [M1]
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B: Then put on a sweater! [M2]
By uttering the then-clause, B states that given M1, s/he committed to the fact that A
is cold and that A wants to be warmer.
(27) IB, M1 = {A is cold; A wants to be warmer}
By uttering the then-clause (M2), in addition to the conventional meaning of the
imperative, B indicates that the best worlds according to what s/he knows are worlds
in which A puts on a sweater (paraphrased below using should):
(28) IB, M2 = {B should put on a sweater}
In the example above, then appeals to epistemic regularities. Given what I know,
since you are cold, it is true that you should put on a sweater. The evaluation of the
should-statement is made taking into account your wish to be warmer. Given what I
know, it is true that in the best possibilities (in which you are warmer), you put on a
sweater (see Arregui 2010; Kratzer 2012 regarding deontic modals embedded under
epistemic operators).
4.5 Predictions
The antecedents and consequents of then: The first prediction is that then-clauses
cannot be uttered out of the blue, since they wouldn’t have an antecedent and hence
then would not find what it needs for its interpretation. Given speakers’ intuitions,
this prediction is borne out. The other prediction refers to the kind of clauses that are
good antecedents and consequents. Since then takes its antecedent and consequent
from the commitment set, when a question is asked the only thing that makes its way
to the commitment set (besides possible presuppositions triggered within it or other
inferences and entailments) is that the speaker asked a question. The same happens
when the speaker utters an imperative, what makes its way to the commitment set is
that the speaker ordered/suggested something (that the speaker considers the worlds
in which X is true to be the best). Hence, the antecedent or consequent of then in
these cases is about the fact that X was asked or that X was suggested.
The question is why (10) is not possible:10
(10) # Question - Imperative
A: What does lambda mean?
10 Exclamatives (not to be confused with sentence exclamations), don’t seem to be possible in then-
clauses. One possible explanation could be that exclamatives have a discourse contribution different
from that of assertion. According to Rett 2011, the exclamative How tall John is! is a property of
degrees. This, I take is the key to explaining the impossibility of then-exclamative clauses: the only
thing that makes its way to the information gain is that the speaker does not expect a degree d of X to
be achieved, which does not make for a good consequent.
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B: # Then study today’s lesson! You will find out, hopefully!
B:
√
Study today’s lesson! You will find out, hopefully!
The utterance of the imperative without then is felicitous and is interpreted as a
refusal to provide an answer. To explain the infelicity in the then-case in (10) we
need to take into account that to ask a question is to demand an answer (the speaker
wants the addressee to provide an answer), i.e., in this sense questions are like
commands (Lewis 1969). Taking into account the felicity conditions imposed by
then, if the utterance were felicitous we would be accepting that the best possible
worlds (according to some laws) in which the speaker demands to obtain an answer
are worlds in which the addressee refuses to provide one! This is not an accepted
interpretation.
Davis’s (1983) examples: Recall the contrast between conditionals with and without
then from Davis 1983:
(3) a. If you open the refrigerator, it will not explode.
b. If you open the refrigerator, then it will not explode.
We saw that the preferred interpretation for (3a) is one in which your opening of
the fridge won’t cause it to explode. However, given the right contextual conditions
(3a) could also have the interpretation that your opening of the fridge will prevent
it from exploding. Imagine that the fridge is making a strange noise, has a very
hot surface and is in danger of exploding. You phone John, who knows a lot about
fridges and how they work, and you explain the situation to him. The utterance
of (3a) in that context is interpreted as (3b) would be: your opening of the fridge
will prevent it from exploding. However, as we saw, (3b) only has this last reading.
The current account makes the right predictions regarding these examples. That
we can have two readings for (3a) is due to the two possible scopes of negation: if
p, ¬q and ¬ (if p, q). Negation can scope over the consequent (narrow scope), in
which case the reading is one in which your opening of the refrigerator will prevent
it from exploding, or over the entire conditional (wide scope), in which case the
reading is one in which your opening of the refrigerator won’t cause it to explode.
Even though English speakers prefer the wide scope reading for (3a) (probably for
common sense reasons), the narrow-scope reading is available, as we have seen.
However, the wide scope reading is not available in (3b). Why? One could think
that then blocks movement preventing negation from taking wide scope. However,
this explanation is hard to maintain:
(29) If his mother is angry, then every boy is upset.
Arguably, (29) has a reading in which the pronoun in the antecedent is bound by
the quantifier in the consequent. Under standard approaches, this means that the
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quantifier phrase takes wide scope over then, which wouldn’t be a barrier in this
case. So, saying that then blocks movement would only apply to negation.
A closer inspection of the data presents another explanation. It seems that when
the context allows us to reconstruct a dependence between the antecedent and the
consequent with negation we prefer the narrow-scope reading (see (31) below).
However, if the reading resulting from narrow scope is implausible because we do
not recover any dependence between antecedent and consequent,11 we can always
fall back on a wide scope reading. After all, a wide-scope reading only states that
there is no correlation between p and q (¬[if p, q]). As expected, when it is not clear
whether we can establish a dependence between antecedent and consequent we have
perfectly ambiguous conditionals, (30).
(30) If McDonald’s buys Wendy’s, Wendy’s employees won’t lose their jobs.
The utterance of (30), without contextual information, is ambiguous between Mc-
Donald’s purchase of Wendy’s preventing any job loss (if p, ¬q) and the statement
that it is not the case that there is any correlation between McDonald’s purchase of
Wendy’s and the loss of jobs (¬[ if p, q]). Notice that the difference between (30)
and (3a) is independence: when independence is obvious, we obtain a wide-scope
reading for negation, when we do not know, it’s ambiguous. When it is (contextu-
ally) obvious that there is a link between antecedent and consequent we obtain a
narrow-scope reading even in the absence of then:
(31) Wendy’s is on the verge of bankruptcy and they will have to let many em-
ployees go, but McDonald’s need to expand their market and they will need
lots of workers. If McDonald’s buys Wendy’s, Wendy’s employees won’t
lose their jobs.
Claiming that when the conditional is independent we obtain a wide-scope
reading for negation amounts to saying that the preferred reading is one in which
negation has narrow scope. Why would we prefer a narrow-scope reading? Speakers
prefer to interpret conditionals as establishing a dependence between antecedent and
consequent,12 —that would the obvious reason for the speaker to put them together!
Indeed, that is why the presence of then seems superfluous many times. Having
wide-scope negation simply denies that there is any kind of dependence, hence being
disfavoured. Notice also that if p, ¬q is more informative than ¬(if p, q) since the
former entails the later. Given that stronger claims (more informative statements) are
preferred, the narrow scope reading is preferred also for this reason. This explanation
11 Antecedent and consequent are independent. Notice that this is not what Bennett 2003 has in mind
for what he dubs independent conditionals: “[In independent conditionals] one can get the consequent
from the antecedent without input from any matters of particular fact” (Bennett 2003: 16).
12 Indeed, if possible, speakers tend to pragmatically strengthen the conditional claim interpreting them
not just as sufficient but necessary conditions (conditional perfection, see Geis & Zwicky 1971 a.o.).
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for the relative scope of negation allows us to explain the contrast in (3). Because
prima facie there is no correlation between opening a fridge and a fridge-explosion
(given what we standardly know about fridges), the preferred reading for (3a) is one
in which negation has wide scope (the claim is that there is no correlation between
the truth of the antecedent and the consequent), but contextual information can make
prominent the narrow-scope reading.
The question now becomes why in (3b) the reading with wide-scope negation is
not available. Recall that when negation takes wide-scope over the conditional (¬[if
p, q]) the meaning is basically that there is no correlation between antecedent and
consequent. The result of interpreting a conditional containing then with wide-scope
interpretation is then a contradiction. Truth-conditionally, ¬(if p, then q) states that
the truth of q is independent from the truth of p. However, the felicity conditions
imposed by then require that p and q be dependent (there is a law-like dependence).
BCs and bactrackers: The inclusion of then in a conditional prevents a BC reading.
The inclusion of then imposes a particular type of modal relation between the
antecedent and the consequent. But a conditional is a BC when such a relation is not
possible, and we interpret that the consequent is true regardless of the consequent
(in BCs we infer that antecedent and consequent are orthogonal). The presence of
then makes impossible such interpretation and hence when then is present the BC
reading is not available.
In the case of backtrackers (If Jim had asked Jack for help, there would have
(to have) been no quarrel yesterday), (roughly) the presence of then is possible
because the antecedent provides information about what makes the consequent more
probable. More precisely, the account proposed in this paper predicts the availability
of then since the felicity conditions simply impose that given what we know, the
best worlds according to Jim’s regular behavior similar to the actual world in which
he asks Jack for help are worlds in which they did not quarrel.
When the consequent presupposes the antecedent: Iatridou 1994 argues that then
is not allowed when the consequent presupposes the antecedent:
(32) If Mary bakes a cakei, (#then) she gives some slice of iti to John.
The judgement reported above with respect to then may be too strong for English
speakers. Although some speakers find (32) degraded, others do not find a difference
between the presence/absence of then. But even those who find (32) degraded, report
improvement if the future marking is inserted as in (33), which is perfectly fine.
(33) If Mary bakes a cakei, then she will give some slice of iti to John.
This suggests that there is a different explanation for (32) independent from
presupposition. It may be that the reason that some speakers find (32) degraded is
that then may be read as establishing a rather redundant causal explanation: that
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John gets a slice of the cake that Mary baked depends on Mary baking the cake.
While the same could hold of (33), there is a difference: in the case of (33) we do
not know whether Mary will bake a cake, in the case of (32), however, we do know
that Mary baked a cake (at least once). Beyond establishing a rather trivial causal
explanation, the utterance of (33) provides information about the epistemic state of
the speaker (we don’t know whether Mary will bake a cake). The utterance of (32)
only establishes a trivial causal explanation, and under this reading the presence of
then is thus degraded.
Modal subordination: Notice the contrast between the following examples:13
(34) a. I wish the bus were on time. ?(Then) I’d get home before midnight.
b. I hope the bus comes on time. ??(Then) I’ll get home before midnight.
c. You can’t go outside! (#Then) You’ll freeze.
That speakers prefer then in (34a) and (34b) is expected. The presence of then
helps the addressee anticipate that there is a modal connection between information
gained after the utterance of the first clause and information gained by the utterance
of the second clause. In the absence of then the speaker has to work out why the
two clauses were uttered consecutively and pragmatically supply a posteriori the
connection that then would provide conventionally in an immediate manner. The
contrast between (34a) and (34b), the latter being more degraded, is explained by the
fact that the use of would in (34a) announces that there is an implicit antecedent (see
Kasper 1992) and we can anticipate the need to recover it in the adjacent linguistic
context, establishing a modal relation even without the presence of then.
The impossibility of (34c) is derived from the fact that the felicity conditions
require us to understand that the best worlds (according to some laws) in which you
are not allowed to go outside are worlds in which you end up freezing (roughly, that
you will end up freezing because you are not allowed to go outside). However, the
intended message is not quite that, but rather the opposite.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I have presented arguments supporting the idea that there are lexical
items whose meaning contribution requires taking into account discourse structure.
In particular, I have argued that then establishes an anaphoric relation between
two consecutive discourse moves. Then imposes a modal felicity condition: that
two propositions within the information gain after each move stand in a law-like
relation. The presence of then requires that the sequence of moves establish a causal
explanatory claim.
13 Thanks to Peter Klecha for presenting me the puzzle in (34).
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